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Abstract:  Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show 
quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and 
formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the 
phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated 
spatiotemporal modeling for navigation. 
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Introduction 
 
Klein & Barron (2016) (K & B) and Barron & Klein (2016) argue that in both vertebrate and 
insect lineages there is an integrated behavioral control system for effective decision making 
and action selection. On this basis the authors develop their proposition that subjective 
experience (sentience) arose as a consequence of such a system, leading to the idea that 
insects as vertebrates are equipped with the faculty of sentience. 
 
We agree with the authors that counterarguments against insects as research models in 
neuroscience — as are often found in the literature — are not helpful. In particular, we too 
disagree with the common notion that (i) the number of neurons in insects is too small or (ii) 
that their brain does not show enough complexity to reach the level of consciousness. In 
addition, we support K & B’s statement that insect brains have been consistently 
underestimated.  
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Subjective experience, an epistemological problem 
 
K & B, however, infer subjective experience from a functional similarity. Here we see an 
epistemological problem (cf. Schilling & Cruse, 2016): We can be sure about subjective 
experience (or internal perspective or first person view) only for ourselves. Nobody, except 
myself, can feel my feelings. Even if the states of my brain were accessible to external 
observers, they could only observe the neuronal activities; they could not experience my 
feelings. They are “private.” The external observer cannot even decide whether subjective 
experiences are being felt at all, or the subject is merely pretending. Among humans there is 
an indirect argument by analogy: All humans have the same kind of brain. As we assume that 
subjective experience results from properties of the brain, other humans should have the 
same properties as I. So, if I have subjective experience, they probably have it too. 
 
But as we do not (yet) know what neural components and dynamics are required for this 
phenomenon to occur, we can only speculate regarding nonhuman subjects; this is also true 
for artificial systems. A possible experimental approach to this problem will briefly be 
described below. 
 
Comparison with artificial systems 
 
To support their thesis, K & B do a good job in marshalling evidence and arguments that 
show quite similar functions in humans and insects (their Figures 1 and 2 and related text). 
Here, we point out that such properties can also be found in robots, for example, in a 
network called reaCog that runs a hexapod robot (Cruse & Schilling, 2015). This network 
does not rely on details of either mammalian or insect brains as sketched in K & B’s Figure 2. 
Rather, inspired by insect studies, the network implements basic properties of the insect 
motor control system, including action selection, decision making, navigation and learning. 
ReaCog contains what K &B describe as a “common final pathway for action planning.” There 
is competition and cooperation between neuronal elements, and there is no place for a 
“Cartesian theatre,” very much in agreement with what is known about insects.  
 
However, reaCog has properties not (yet) found in insects such as planning ahead and 
inventing new solutions by exploiting the capacity for global access to memory information 
outside the current context. Using a holistic internal body model (Schilling et al., 2012), the 
system as a whole has capabilities like the ones K & B describe as the basis for a unified 
multimodal neuronal model of the agent within its environment. Thus, according to Barron & 
Klein, reaCog should at least be equipped with subjective experience.  
 
We did a systematic study of whether properties often attributed to consciousness can be 
found in reaCog. Once certain properties had been added to the network (Cruse & Schilling 
2015), there seemed to be a strong basis for inferring that the system showed some access 
consciousness and reflexive consciousness, but not for inferring phenomenal consciousness 
(i.e., subjective experience). This was because we have no idea yet what neural activities are 
responsible for producing subjective experience; this is what we mean by an epistemological 
problem. 
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In human beings, subjective experience is under competitive control 
 
The problem of relating function to subjective experience arises not only when comparing 
insects with vertebrates, or with robots. It also arises with the human brain as illustrated by 
the following example. The basic experiment was performed by Fehrer & Raab (1962) and 
detailed studies followed (Neumann & Klotz, 1994). Human participants first had to learn to 
press a button whenever a single square was shown on a screen, but not when two squares 
were shown on either side of the first square. The critical condition took place after the 
learning phase: the single square was presented very briefly (about 30 ms) followed by a 
longer presentation of the two squares. The participants reported not having seen the single 
square, only the two squares. Yet they pressed the button.  
 
This shows that the memory elicited first (“motor response to single-square stimulus”) can 
be executed without being accompanied by subjective experience of the single square. It 
also shows that the memory “no motor response to double-square stimulus” influences 
whether the content of the first memory is experienced. This suggests that this memory 
inhibits the subjective experience of the first stimulus. (For a quantitative simulation see 
Cruse & Schilling, 2015, Fig 8.)  
 
From these observations in humans, we conclude that specific procedures may or may not 
be accompanied by subjective experience, which apparently requires more time and is under 
the control of other competing memories. This means that we cannot infer from function to 
subjective experience in humans. Hence, when we observe similar functions in insects and 
mammals, they may not be having subjective experiences either.  
 
Navigation using a decentralized architecture 
 
Another problem concerns the possible over-interpretation of data – in this case insect data. 
A specific example is K & B’s comparison of nematodes and insects. We agree that 
nematodes are not able to navigate the way bees and ants can. However, the fascinating 
ability of bees and ants to navigate does not require K & B’s “integrated spatiotemporal 
modeling.” Navigation in ants and bees can be explained by relatively simple, decentralized 
neuronal structures (Cruse & Wehner, 2011; Hoinville et al., 2012). There is no evidence that 
they can form “spatial relationships between arbitrary objects.” Insects can learn (by vector 
navigation) a food location (by vector navigation) and they have local information that 
indicates where to move (based on local visual input). In reaCog, there is integration of 
sensation and action but there is no evidence that this is the case in insects (although it is 
sometimes postulated that information is “integrated in a common navigational reference”; 
Menzel et al., 2011). Thus, the key feature postulated by K & B for subjective experience is 
not available for insects (based on the evidence to date). 
 
Conclusion 
 
So whereas we find K & B’s contribution extremely interesting and inspiring, we have two 
objections. One concerns the epistemological problem, the other an unjustified 
interpretation of the data. In our view, the only way to proceed would be to explore the 
detailed properties of neuronal structures that lead to subjective experience. But we can 
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only do such studies with human subjects because only there can we be sure that subjective 
experience is occurring, and can be reported. Such a research program may reveal the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a neural network to have subjective experience. 
Success would not solve the hard problem, but the knowledge gained would allow us to 
predict which features of our neuronal function generate subject experience. The ability to 
predict the occurrence of subjective experience may then be enough to give us the 
impression of having understood the phenomenon currently still dubbed the “hard problem” 
(Cruse, 1999, 2003).  
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